Getlink (GET)
The single-asset Channel Tunnel concession to 2086: FY2025 revenue €1,595m, EBITDA €859m at 53.9% margin, net debt €3,392m at 3.9× EBITDA.
Educational analysis for professional use. This profile is not investment advice or a recommendation to buy or sell any security, and it is not personalised.
Snapshot
The Mono-Asset Finite-Life Case
Getlink is the single-asset concession DCF case: one Channel Tunnel, concession to 2086, terminal value zero. Net debt was €3,392 million at 31 December 2025, consistent with the leverage ratio above; revenue, EBITDA margin, and market cap are in the metrics strip too.
Ferrovial layers concessions through a holding company; Vinci runs a spread of segment margins; Aena sits inside a regulatory RAB cycle. Getlink has none of that structural noise. The analytical work is matching mixed tariff mechanics to the remaining cash-flow path: railway access charges inflation-linked (passenger trains: inflation minus 1.1% a year), LeShuttle commercial pricing with CPI escalation, Eleclink market-based.
Business Overview
FY2025 traffic was mixed by mode: LeShuttle passengers rose and truck crossings fell (the metrics above carry the exact split), while Eurostar passengers grew +5% to 11,814,753. Rail access volumes drive inflation-linked revenue; LeShuttle and shuttle operations carry commercial demand risk with CPI escalation on fares.
The escalators guide places Getlink's inflation-minus-1.1% passenger-rail access formula alongside French motorway CPI floors and Transurban's CPI-or-4% WestConnex deed. Negative spread to inflation on rail access is a deliberate regulatory and commercial term, not an operating slip.
How Concession Economics Work Here
A finite-life DCF to 2086 sums discounted after-tax cash flows with terminal value zero at reversion. The finite-life DCF guide uses Getlink alongside Transurban and Ferrovial as demand-risk and mixed-tariff anchors; its remaining life sits between Vinci Escota (~6 years) and Ferrovial's 407 ETR (~73 years) on the concession-life spectrum in the concession life guide.
EBITDA margin of 53.9% sits below pure urban toll roads (Transurban 75.1%, Vinci Autoroutes 71.0%) but above Ferrovial's ~15.1% group margin. Mixed rail-access and shuttle economics compress margin against a single-mode toll road while remaining infrastructure-like.
Net debt/EBITDA of 3.9× at 31 December 2025 sits within the 3-5× band this analysis treats as normal, above Vinci (1.4×) and Aena (1.46×) but below Ferrovial consolidated (~4.0×). Credit capacity is adequate for a mono-asset, though lighter regulated-airport peers carry less leverage still.
Valuation Framework
Build one DCF to 2086 with separate revenue lines for inflation-linked rail access (passenger: inflation − 1.1% p.a.), LeShuttle CPI-escalated commercial fares, and Eleclink market revenues. Discount at a built nominal post-tax WACC of 8.21%, not a bare Treasury anchor: 4.50% risk-free plus a 5.50% equity risk premium on a beta relevered to 1.125 at 40% gearing, blended with a 6.00% pre-tax cost of debt at 25% tax, plus any project spread. EV/EBITDA ~10–14× regulated/availability band or ~12–16× demand-risk band is a cross-check only; tariff mix spans both.
The FY2025 mode split, trucks down while LeShuttle passengers rose, shows demand risk at corridor level inside the same asset. Volume forecasts should not assume one elasticity for the whole tunnel.
What to Watch in the Financials
Mode-level traffic. Rail access charges track train operator volumes; shuttle and truck corridors have different cyclicality. Eurostar's +5% passenger growth outran LeShuttle and truck moves in FY2025.
Rail access escalator (inflation − 1.1%). Real tariff path can lag inflation even when nominal charges rise. Model the formula explicitly, do not paste a generic CPI linker from motorways.
3.9× leverage. Net debt €3,392 million on €859 million EBITDA leaves less headroom than Vinci/Aena sub-1.5× peers if EBITDA softens.
2086 expiry. ~61 years remaining supports a long DCF but still ends at zero terminal value. Any perpetuity multiple on Getlink ignores reversion.
Peer Context
Against Transurban (75.1% margin, gearing 37.8%/FFO-debt 10.5%, no headline ND/EBITDA), Getlink is lower margin, files 3.9× net debt/EBITDA, and runs a single asset with mixed tariffs rather than >90% CPI/fixed urban toll deeds.
Against Ferrovial 407 ETR (~73 years, uncapped dynamic tolling), Getlink's ~61 years is shorter but still ultra-long life; tariff mechanics are more inflation-formula driven on rail access than operator-set dynamic tolls.
Key Risks
Mode and customer concentration. Eurostar, LeShuttle, and rail operators concentrate revenue on one physical asset. Operator financial stress or route competition hits access charge volumes directly.
Truck volume cyclicality. Freight crossings fell in FY2025 while LeShuttle passengers rose; the two modes do not share the same demand cycle.
Leverage at 3.9×. That sits in the normal band rather than the conservative one below 3×. EBITDA shocks transmit to credit metrics faster than at Vinci's 1.4×.
Concession reversion in 2086. Infrastructure returns to grantor; equity DCF must not capitalise beyond that date.
Transport Infrastructure Sector Primer
Concession life, traffic growth and the toll escalator feed a finite-life DCF with no terminal value, landing a concession value to weigh against the EV/EBITDA shortcut.
The Excel model is the primer's concession build live across 9 sheets: a finite-life after-tax free-cash-flow DCF with zero terminal value, a WACC build block (risk-free rate, equity risk premium, relevered beta and cost of debt), a traffic-and-tariff build, a regulated-versus-demand-risk two-mode switch, a leverage screen and a multiples cross-check. Change the remaining life, any WACC input or the traffic growth and the concession value moves; the cross-check and leverage sheets update alongside it.